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The Nature of the Mughal State
There has long been a debate among historians regarding the nature of Mughal rule in India. The central questions of this debate are: Was the Mughal state a theocracy? If not, was it despotic? And if it was despotic, was it absolute or benevolent? The extent to which the Mughal state was military-based or aristocratic is also a matter of debate.
Historians such as S. R. Sharma and Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi have offered a communal interpretation of the Mughal state system. In his book The Religious Policy of the Mughal Emperors, S. R. Sharma argued that all Mughal rulers, except Akbar, were religiously orthodox. He particularly criticised Aurangzeb. According to Sharma, due to religious prejudice, Mughal rulers from Akbar to Aurangzeb were unwilling to appoint Hindus in administration; hence, the number of Hindus in the court was small. Hindus were subjected to oppressive taxes like jizya and faced unnecessary harassment, including temple destruction. However, Aligarh historian Athar Ali, in his critique of this book published in the second volume of Medieval India edited by Irfan Habib, demonstrated that Sharma attempted to prove the theocratic nature of the Mughal state by incorporating repeated factual errors and unhistorical incidents. Athar Ali further noted that the subject matter of the book was sensitive and carried political implications in the contemporary context; therefore, treating it superficially without due care for facts was futile.
On the other hand, historian Qureshi, in his book The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, argued that the creation of Pakistan resulted from Hindu hostility toward Muslims in India. He also claimed that Babur established the Mughal Empire to protect Indian Muslims from Rajput oppression. Qureshi described Akbar as a villain of Islam and asserted that the decline of the Mughal Empire led to the ruin of Indian Muslims. These views were effectively challenged by A. J. Qaiser, who demonstrated how historically inaccurate and biased Qureshi’s arguments were.
That the Mughal state was not a theocracy becomes clear when several factors are considered. Theoretically, as Muslims, the Mughal rulers were expected to follow Islamic law, but in practice, they rarely did so. By adopting the title Padshah, they sought the status of a sovereign ruler. The title itself symbolized power and authority and had no basis in the Quran. The Quran envisaged the sovereignty of God, with the Caliph merely acting as the leader of the people under divine rule. In contrast, the Mughal system represented the domination of humans over humans. The Mughals propagated the idea that the king was God’s representative on earth and could act arbitrarily—an idea entirely contrary to the Quran. Even Aurangzeb, regarded as a standard-bearer of orthodoxy, could not follow the Quranic principles of statecraft. In reality, Mughal theories of power closely resembled Persian concepts of kingship. K. M. Ashraf made a pertinent observation in his book Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan, noting that Quranic teachings were effective within the democratic traditions of Medina. As Islam expanded beyond Medina to different parts of the world, these teachings disappeared from the character of rulers, who, for political reasons, ignored Quranic injunctions and Medinan traditions to establish autocratic monarchies.
The Mughal emperors followed Quranic injunctions in their personal lives as far as possible, but not in matters of state. Had they done so, Akbar would not have conceived the idea of Din-i-Ilahi, would have performed the Hajj with great ceremony, promoted Islam through state initiative, acknowledged the Caliph’s authority, placed the ulema in high positions in state affairs, and would never have abolished jizya (even if it is assumed to be a religious tax) or shown leniency in its collection. None of these features was evident during the reign of any Mughal ruler, including the so-called orthodox Aurangzeb. How, then, can the Mughal state be called a theocracy?
Like S. R. Sharma, several historians have attempted to portray the Mughal religious policy—particularly under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb—as anti-Hindu, citing temple destruction and the imposition of jizya as evidence. However, B. N. Pande, in his book Islam and Indian Culture, demonstrated that Aurangzeb was not anti-Hindu. He granted jagirs to many temples for their maintenance. Just as he destroyed some temples for political reasons, he also destroyed certain mosques. These unpopular actions were taken due to law-and-order concerns, not out of religious hatred. Moreover, does the Quran sanction the destruction of places of worship belonging to other religions?
Another important point deserves mention. Akbar, often regarded as sympathetic to Hindus, had reintroduced jizya, whereas Aurangzeb—the symbol of supposed orthodoxy—waited twenty-two years after ascending the throne before reintroducing it. Toward the end of his reign, there was extreme laxity in its collection. Court nobles and even his daughter, Jeb-un-Nisa, strongly protested for its abolition. This suggests that jizya was not linked to religion but to economic considerations. Quranic injunctions or the ulema’s fatwas did not determine policy; financial necessity did.
Can Mughal rule, then, be described as despotic? The answer is yes—but this despotism was not absolute. The foundations of Mughal administration lay in tolerance and public welfare. Traditional Indian customs, social practices, and village self-governance remained largely intact. Mughal rulers adopted a policy of religious tolerance and regarded Indian soil as their homeland. However, their concepts of welfare and secularism should not be judged by the standards of the modern state. There were no public welfare departments as we understand them today, and welfare activities were largely confined to areas around the capital and provincial capitals. Irfan Habib has noted that no welfare projects were implemented in villages, nor did villages enjoy the status of the lowest unit of administration. Yet whenever rebellions occurred in villages, the Mughal state actively took responsibility for suppressing them. Religious identity held no official place in the imperial court. From Akbar’s time onward, the number of Hindu nobles steadily increased, reaching its highest proportion under Aurangzeb, as demonstrated by Athar Ali’s research.
Some historians have described the Mughal system as a military state. Irfan Habib, however, remarked that the Mughal state cannot even be termed a military state. Given that public welfare and efficient governance were among its defining features, it cannot be compared to the benevolent despots of eighteenth-century Europe. Although the Mughals adopted repressive measures against the Afghans, this did not hinder their welfare-oriented activities.
Although Mughal rulers claimed divine authority, they could not ignore the nobility. The advice of nobles was given due importance in governance, though final decision-making power rested with the emperor. Even so, emperors avoided making decisions that would bring them into direct conflict with the nobility.
In conclusion, in the Indian context—where the majority of the population was non-Muslim—the literal application of Islamic state theory was impossible. Recognising this fundamental reality, the Mughal rulers introduced a new state policy suited to the needs of time and place. Jadunath Sarkar described this system as a Persian-Arabic system in the Indian setting. While preserving earlier institutions, the Mughals integrated new elements through necessary adaptations. They established a centralised despotism in which, for the first time, merit—regardless of caste or religion—became the principal criterion for advancement, and the welfare of subjects emerged as a central concern of administration.
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